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Comparing Stroop-like and Simon 
Effects on Perceptual Features
Elisa Scerrati  1, Luisa Lugli1, Roberto Nicoletti1 & Carlo Umiltà2
Stroop-like and Simon tasks produce two sources of interference in human information processing. 
Despite being logically similar, it is still debated whether the conflicts ensuing from the two tasks are 
resolved by the same or different mechanisms. In the present study, we compare two accounts of 
the Stroop-like effect. According to the Perceptual Account, the Stroop-like effect is due to Stimulus-
Stimulus congruence. According to the Decisional Account, the Stroop-like effect results from the 
same mechanisms that produce the Simon effect, that is, Stimulus-Response compatibility. In two 
experiments we produced Stroop-like and Simon effects by presenting left/right-located stimuli 
consisting of a colored square surrounded by a frame of the same color as the square or of a different 
color. Results showed that discriminating either the color of the square (Experiment 1) or that of the 
frame (Experiment 2) yielded additive Stroop-like and Simon effects. In addition, the patterns of 
temporal distributions of the two effects were different. These results support the Perceptual Account of 
the Stroop-like effect and the notion that the Stroop-like effect and the Simon effect occur at different 
processing stages and are attributable to different mechanisms.
Imagine you are speaking at an important workshop over Skype and all of a sudden an alarm in your building sets 
off. What would you do, besides thinking that this is the weirdest Skype call you have ever been on? The difficulty 
to act in such a situation lies in the fact that our information processing system must pay selective attention to 
the primary task while trying to ignore the co-occurring stimulus. Our lives are filled with such (maybe less the-
atrical) situations.
In this article, we attempt to investigate how selective attention works by making recourse to the factorial 
combination of two well established cognitive tasks, that is, the Stroop-like task and the Simon task. These tasks 
are seen as gaining access to the basics of cognition, providing clues to the fundamental process of attention. In 
doing so we will make reference to the Dimensional Overlap model (DO) and taxonomy developed by Kornblum 
and his colleagues1–5.
In Kornblum’s taxonomy, eight types of compatibility tasks are distinguished and each is assumed to give rise 
to a specific type of compatibility effect. The core idea of this taxonomy is that of dimensional overlap, that is, 
“the degree to which a stimulus set and a response set, or two or more aspects of a stimulus set or a response set, 
are perceptually, structurally, or conceptually similar”3 (p. 875). In the present study, we are concerned with the 
Type-3 and Type-4 effects. The former is also known as the “Simon effect”6–10 and is characterized by a dimen-
sional overlap between the response set and a task-irrelevant stimulus dimension. The Type-4 effect, also known 
as “Stroop-like effect”11–14, is characterized by a dimensional overlap between two stimulus dimensions, one rele-
vant for performing the task and the other non-relevant. The Stroop-like effect is often referred to as S-S overlap. 
However, in the present paper we will be using the term Stroop-like in accordance with Kornblum’s taxonomy.
In tasks that produce the Simon effect, that is, in “Simon tasks”, the stimulus spatial position is not task rele-
vant and participants respond to a non-spatial stimulus attribute (e.g., color, shape or pitch). The effect emerges 
because responses are faster and more accurate when stimulus position (i.e., an irrelevant stimulus dimension) 
and response position (i.e., a relevant response dimension) correspond (e.g., right stimulus–right response) than 
when they do not (e.g., right stimulus–left response). Several authors posit that the Simon effect results from 
the automatic coding of stimulus position, which, in turn, automatically activates the spatially corresponding 
response, thus producing a competition, at the response selection stage, between the spatially corresponding 
response and the response required on the basis of task instructions2,5 (though, see15 for a different explanation of 
the Simon effect; see10,16,17 for reviews).
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In the classical Stroop task14, participants respond to the ink color of stimuli consisting of words denoting 
colors. Responses are faster when the relevant stimulus dimension (i.e., the ink color) and the irrelevant stimulus 
dimensions (i.e., the name of the color) are congruent (e.g., the word “red” printed in red) rather than incongru-
ent (e.g., the word “red” printed in green). In Stroop-like tasks, such as the flanker task11, the target (e.g., the letter 
F or G) represents the relevant stimulus to which participants have to respond, while different distractor objects, 
the flankers, convey the irrelevant stimulus information. Responses are faster and more accurate when target 
and flankers are congruent (i.e., the central target letter “G” sided by the flanker letters “G” as in “G G G”) rather 
than incongruent (i.e., the central target letter “G” sided by the flanker letters “F” as in “F G F”). Despite being 
conceptually similar to the classical Stroop task, Stroop-like tasks often do not replicate Stroop’s original task. 
This is because the classical Stroop task also involves stimulus-response overlap in addition to stimulus-stimulus 
overlap. Indeed, the original version of the Stroop task required participants to respond vocally to the ink color of 
the stimulus (i.e., a word denoting a color), so that a response dimension overlap occurred with both the relevant 
(i.e., the ink color) and the irrelevant stimulus dimensions (i.e., the meaning of the word denoting the color). For 
this reason, in Kornblum’s latest taxonomy4, the “Stroop effect”, which is produced by the classical Stroop task, 
is a Type-8 effect. Therefore, the term Type-4 effect, which is defined by a sole S-S overlap, only applies to those 
versions of the Stroop task in which subjects respond manually.
An issue that has attracted much interest is whether the classical Stroop and Stroop-like effects occur at the 
same processing stage as the Simon effect (for example, see18,19). This issue can be examined by creating a combi-
nation of tasks and testing for an interaction between the compatibility effects20–22. If the compatibility effects do 
not interact (i.e., they are additive) one can conclude with reasonable certainty that the conflicts are independent 
and are likely mediated by different mechanisms (see23 for a review; see below for a more extensive discussion of 
the additive factor method, AFM, introduced by Sternberg24). For example, a factorial task-crossing design would 
be one that combines Simon and Stroop tasks by presenting color-word stimuli at peripheral locations. Although 
the results of these studies are not crystal-clear (e.g., in the case of Hommel’s study20, two out of three experiments 
showed interactivity) the accepted conclusion is that they attest to additivity. That is, the conflicts that characterize 
Stroop-like and Simon tasks would occur at different processing stages.
The issue of whether Stroop-like and Simon effects occur at the same or at a different processing stage, and, 
thus, are mediated by the same mechanism or by different mechanisms, has also been explored by making 
recourse to the sequence congruency effect. Gratton, Coles, and Donchin25 were the first to observe a sequence 
congruency effect, that is, an interaction between previous and current trial congruency, according to which 
congruency effects were smaller following incongruent trials than following congruent ones (also, see23,26 for 
reviews). This phenomenon is often explained on the basis of the conflict monitoring model, which holds that 
the congruency sequence effect stems from conflict-driven adjustments in cognitive control23,27 (though alter-
native explanations were put forward28–30; see23,26 for reviews). A strategy for exploring whether Stroop-like and 
Simon effects occur at different processing stages and depend on different mechanisms consists of construct-
ing an experiment that combines the two tasks while comparing sequence congruency effects within tasks and 
between tasks23,26. If the two effects involve the same mechanisms, the sequence congruency effect should be the 
same between and within tasks. If the mechanisms are different, there should be no sequence congruency effect 
between tasks. A number of studies have adopted this strategy31–37. Based on the results of these studies, a fairly 
good case can be made for the claim that conflict resolution in Stroop-like tasks is mediated by a different process 
(and associated neural circuitry) than in Simon tasks32. Specifically, conflict resolution in the Stroop task likely 
involves the excitatory biasing of task-relevant stimulus processing32,38, whereas conflict resolution in the Simon 
task likely involves the inhibition of direct route response-priming processes32,39.
Having reached this stage, one might conclude that the issue is settled and no further evidence is needed: 
Stroop-like effects and the Simon effect occur at different processing stages and involve different mechanisms. 
However, a closer look at the available evidence suggests that further inquiry might be useful. Stimuli in Stroop 
tasks, but also in Stroop-like tasks, are very often verbal in nature. There is, therefore, the possibility that the lack 
of an interaction between Simon and Stroop-like effects is attributable to the different nature of the stimuli rather 
than to the two effects being mediated by different mechanisms. As will be discussed in more detail below, while 
interference in the classical Stroop task originates from a semantic conflict between ink color and meaning of 
the verbal stimulus, interference in the Simon task originates from a non-semantic conflict between the different 
locations occupied by stimuli and responses.
Let us now take into consideration the reason why the mechanisms should be different. Because the stimuli 
in the Stroop-like task (i.e., colored words denoting colors in the manual Stroop task and letters in the flanker 
task) are unrelated to the responses (i.e., left-right keypresses), congruence effects might be attributable to pro-
cesses occurring at the stage of stimulus identification rather than response selection, as, instead is the case for 
the Simon task. That is, given that the only overlap in the Stroop-like task is that between the relevant stimulus 
dimension and the irrelevant stimulus dimension (i.e., the ink color and the name of the color in the manual 
Stroop task; the target and flanker letters in the flanker task), neither response activation nor response compe-
tition processes, able to produce compatibility effects, would occur. This explanation, known as the Perceptual 
Account of the manual Stroop effect and the Stroop-like effect, is based on the presence or absence of S–S congru-
ence2,5 (also, see15 for S-S congruence effects). As already mentioned, much evidence supporting the Perceptual 
Account of Stroop and Stroop-like effects, and thus for the independence of these effects from the Simon effect, 
has been gathered18,20–22,40–42. Basically, the main finding of these studies consists in showing additive rather than 
interactive Stroop and Simon effects. According to Sternberg’s24 AFM, if two factors do not interact, they are said 
to be additive and are thought to affect different processing stages. Additivity between two factors means that they 
operate at two different processing stages that take place serially (also, see43). In addition, evidence supporting the 
Perceptual Account of the Stroop-like effect has been reported by studies assessing conflict adaptation effects, that 
is, the reduction of interference arising when two consecutive incongruent stimuli occur in a sequence of mixed 
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trials (also, see above). Conflict adaptation effects are specific to the type of conflict involved, thus suggesting 
that different types of conflict (i.e., Simon, Stroop) are resolved by different mechanisms at different processing 
stages30,32,44,45 (for reviews, see23,26). Moreover, it appears that spatial peripheral cues modulate the spatial Stroop 
effect but not the Simon effect46,47. Also, Correa, Cappucci, Nobre, and Lupianez48 found a smaller Stroop effect 
with targets appearing at a cued time windows rather than at an uncued one, whereas the Simon and flanker 
effects increased when the time windows was cued rather than uncued.
However, a different explanation, which we term the Decisional Account and is based on the notion of 
short-term stimulus-response associations, explains the Simon effect and might be invoked to explain also 
Stroop and Stroop-like effects. One has only to assume that short-term associations, created on the basis of task 
instructions (e.g., red stimulus–left keypress), can give rise to S-R congruence effects49–51 (for reviews see52,53). For 
instance, in the classical Stroop task, both the ink color of words denoting colors (i.e., the relevant stimulus dimen-
sion) and the name of the color (i.e., the irrelevant stimulus dimension) would activate the responses associated 
with them on the basis of task instruction. Similarly, in Stroop-like tasks such as the flanker task, both the target 
(i.e., the relevant stimulus dimension) and the flankers (i.e., the irrelevant stimulus dimension) would activate the 
responses associated with them on the basis of task instructions. As a consequence, on congruent trials both the 
relevant and the irrelevant stimulus dimensions would activate a common response code, whereas on incongru-
ent trials the relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions would activate competing response codes. Therefore, 
according to the Decisional Account, both the classical Stroop and the Stroop-like effects would be originated by 
the same mechanisms involved in the Simon effect. Results compatible with the Decisional Account were pro-
vided by a number of studies showing either S-R compatibility underlying Stroop and Stroop-like effects49 or an 
interaction between Stroop-like and Simon effects19,20,42,54. As already noted, according to Sternberg’s24 AFM, if 
two factors interact, then they are thought to affect the same processing stage.
The aim of the present study is to shed light on these discrepant results. To this end, we contrasted the 
Perceptual Account and the Decisional Account by combining the Stroop-like effect with the Simon effect in a 
factorial design, while controlling for stimulus attributes. As was pointed out by Li, Nan, Wang, and Liu18, pre-
vious studies that investigated Simon and Stroop effects were not conclusive because of differences in stimulus 
attributes between the two tasks. Specifically, Li et al. argued that, while interference in the classical Stroop task 
stems from semantic conflict (i.e., ink color vs. meaning of the word), interference in the Simon task stems from 
a non-semantic conflict (i.e., different locations for stimulus and response). Therefore, it is uncertain whether 
the conflicts that cause the Stroop and Simon effects are distinct, as the Perceptual Account claims2,5, or mere 
differences in the nature of the stimuli (i.e., words vs. perceptual stimuli) are responsible for the observed dissim-
ilarities. For example, Hommel20 (Experiment 1) asked participants to press a left or right key in response to the 
ink color of target words (i.e., names of colors), which were randomly presented on the left or right side of the 
screen. In such a paradigm, the Stroop conflict concerned the ink color (i.e., relevant stimulus dimension) and 
the meaning of the word (i.e., irrelevant stimulus dimension), whereas the Simon conflict concerned stimulus 
and response spatial positions. Results from this study showed additive Stroop and Simon effects (also see22,41). 
In addition, the RT distributions of the two effects were opposite: The Stroop effect increased, whereas the Simon 
effect decreased with increasing RTs. However, this outcome might simply reflect differences in the nature of the 
stimuli, because the two conflicts concerned different stimulus attributes (i.e., color vs. meaning for the Stroop 
effect, and color vs. spatial position for the Simon effect).
To avoid these shortcomings, Li et al.18 (Experiment 2) introduced a spatial-arrow Stroop task and combined 
it with a Simon task. In the former, the conflict concerned spatial information between arrow locations (i.e., top 
or bottom on the screen) and arrow orientation (i.e., upward or downward). In the latter, the conflict concerned 
locations of the arrows (i.e., left or right) and locations of the responses (i.e., left or right). Thus, conflicts resulting 
from either the spatial-arrow Stroop task or the Simon task were related to spatial attributes of the stimuli. Results 
showed that Stroop-like and Simon effects did not interact even though both originated from spatial attributes.
However, a criticism of the study by Li et al.18, and all previous studies using arrows30,44,46–48, is that the 
Stroop-like conflict was still somehow dependent on a semantic dimension. Indeed, the authors required partic-
ipants to interpret/decode the direction of an arrow. This procedure might have induced some kind of semantic 
processing. Although words differ from arrows, given that the processes underlying the interpretation of words 
are more complex than those underlying the interpretation of arrows55, both types of stimuli pertain to a semantic 
typology (i.e., projective vs. deictic, see also56).
We, therefore, introduced a perceptual manipulation of the stimulus for either task. As in previous studies 
investigating Simon and Stroop-like effects19,40, we chose colored stimuli. Unlike those studies, however, we did 
not adopt a flanker paradigm. For instance, in the study by Treccani, Cubelli, Della Sala, and Umiltà19, partic-
ipants had to judge the color of a central target that was presented together with a left or right-located colored 
flanker of the same color as the target or of a different color. Thus, the flanker conveyed both the irrelevant spatial 
information, which might or might not correspond to the response position and produces the Simon effect, and 
the irrelevant color information, which might or might not be congruent with the target color and produces the 
Stroop-like effect. Results showed an interaction between the two types of conflict, suggesting that the Simon 
effect and the Stroop-like effect (i.e., the flanker effect) are both ascribable to the same processing stage (i.e., the 
response selection or decisional stage). However, the authors acknowledged that their paradigm might have trig-
gered perceptual grouping57,58, and referential coding59,60, which would be compatible with a Perceptual Account 
of the Stroop-like effect. In particular, they acknowledged that, when the target and the flanker were of the same 
color (i.e., congruent condition), they could be seen as forming a perceptual group, that is, one single object 
shifted to one side of the display (i.e., towards the flanker position). For example, a red target presented with a red 
flanker on the right could be seen as one red object shifted to the right. In contrast, when the target and the flanker 
were of different colors (i.e., incongruent condition), the flanker might have served as a reference point for the 
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spatial coding of the target. For example, a red target presented with a green flanker on the right might be coded 
as left, given that it is on the left side of the flanker.
To avoid these confounds, we chose a different Stroop-like paradigm. Our stimuli consisted of colored squares 
surrounded by a frame that could be of the same color as the square or of a different color. Therefore, in our study 
the target contained both the task relevant and the task irrelevant information. In this way, we ruled out a possible 
influence of perceptual grouping or of referential coding, given that our stimuli were built such that the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension (i.e., the frame) encircles the target (i.e., the square) rather than flanking it. In our study, the 
Stroop-like conflict concerned the color of the square (i.e., red or blue) and the color of its frame (i.e., red or blue). 
The Simon conflict concerned the position of the stimulus (i.e., left or right) and the position of the response (i.e., 
left-right keys).
In sum, by following Li et al.18 we compared Stroop-like and Simon effects on a single dimension. That is, 
interference in either task stems from perceptual conflicts rather than from conflicting semantics (name of the 
color and color ink) in one task and from conflicting perceptual information (stimulus and response position) 
in the other task. Therefore, our investigation of the Stroop-like and Simon effects will not be affected by a dif-
ference in stimulus attributes in the two tasks. In addition, as in previous studies combining Stroop-like and 
Simon effects19,40, we adopted a Stroop-like task in which the conflict concerned two colored stimulus objects. 
Importantly, however, at variance with previous studies, which adopted a flanker paradigm, we choose a different 
Stroop-like paradigm, where the conflict, rather than concerning the target and the flanker, concerned two differ-
ent parts of the target (i.e., square and frame).
We hypothesized that, if Stroop-like and Simon conflicts are caused by distinct mechanisms operating inde-
pendently and in linear fashion, as the Perceptual Account suggests2,5, then, when both conflicts are present, we 
should observe additivity. In contrast, if the mechanisms causing the two types of conflicts operate in parallel at 
the same processing stage or share the same processing resources, then the two effects should interact, showing 
interactivity in the form of sub-additivity or super-additivity. An under-additive interaction would be indicative 
of (some) parallel processing (for a thorough explanation, see61), whereas an over-additive interaction would 
be indicative of a shared processing stage between the two factors (the kind of interaction that the Decisional 
Account would predict).
Also, we hypothesized that, if additivity manifested itself, it should occur in conjunction with different time 
courses of the two effects, as was previously found by Hommel20 (Experiment 1) with linguistic rather than 
perceptual stimuli. That is, we expect that the Stroop-like effect is smallest for fast responses and increases as 
responses get slower, whereas the Simon effect is largest for fast responses but decreases as responses slow down. 
Conversely, if an interaction between Stroop-like and Simon effects occurs, then we expect to observe a much 
more complex pattern of time courses, as shown by previous studies19,20 (Experiment 2 and 3, and Experiment 1, 
respectively). Specifically, an under-additive interaction, which suggests a facilitatory effect, should occur in con-
junction with a Simon effect, that, as reaction times become longer, decreases (and/or reverses) with Stroop-like 
incongruent trials20. In contrast, an over-additive interaction, which suggests an inhibitory effect, should occur 
in conjunction with a Simon effect, that, as reaction times become longer, increases with Stroop-like congruent 
trials19.
In Experiment 1, we combined the Stroop-like and Simon tasks. A colored square surrounded by a frame of 
the same color as the square or of a different color (e.g., “red square - red frame” or “red square - blue frame”; see 
Fig. 1) was presented on the right or left side of the screen. Possible conflicts were between the square and the 
frame colors for the Stroop-like task and between square and response positions for the Simon task. In either case, 
the conflict was perceptual in nature (i.e., two colors; two spatial positions). This experimental design allowed 
us to downplay, if not to rule out, the contribution of the semantic dimension, to which the differences between 
Stroop and Simon effects found in previous studies might be attributed. It is also worth noting that previous 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the stimuli. In this example, instructions required to respond with the 
left index finger when the stimulus was red and with the right index finger when the stimulus was blue. This 
two colors are here represented by grey and light grey, respectively. In “panel (a)” the target stimulus is in the 
Stroop-like congruent and Simon corresponding condition; in “panel (b)” the target stimulus is in the Stroop-
like congruent and Simon non-corresponding condition; in “panel (c)” the target stimulus in the Stroop-like 
incongruent and Simon corresponding; in “panel (d)” the target stimulus is in the Stroop-like incongruent and 
Simon non-corresponding condition. Note that elements are not drawn to scale.
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studies found the classical Stroop effect (with colored words) with either vocal or manual responses. According to 
Logan and Sbrodoff62, studies that compared response modalities often found a stronger Stroop effect with vocal 
responses than with manual responses63–70, though some found no difference between response modalities in the 
magnitude of the effect71.
Experiment 2 was conceived to further investigate the Stroop-like task by combining it with the Simon task. 
Navon72,73 (also see74) suggested that perceptual processes could be temporally organized so that they might 
proceed from the processing of the global structure to more and more fine-grained analysis. Thus, according to 
Navon’s hypothesis, we should expect faster and more accurate responses if participants are required to discrim-
inate the color of the frame rather than that of the square. If a task is facilitated when the feature to be discrimi-
nated pertains to a more peripheral component of the stimulus rather than to a more central one, then one can 
conclude that the effect ensuing from that task is due to perceptual processing rather than to decisional mecha-
nisms. Thus, we expected that discriminating the color of the frame produced faster and more accurate responses 
than discriminating the color of the square.
Results
Experiment 1. Two participants, who made 16% of errors or more (corresponding to the mean of the errors 
of all participants plus one standard deviation), were excluded, so that the final sample consisted of 14 partici-
pants. Omissions (0.13%) and RTs faster/slower than the overall participant mean minus/plus 2 standard devia-
tions (3.63%) were excluded from the analyses.
Mean Reaction Times (RTs) of correct responses and arcsin-transformed Error Rates (ERs; 7.7% of total trials) 
were analyzed separately. When sphericity was violated, the Huynh-Feldt correction was applied, although the 
original degrees of freedom are reported.
To estimate the Stroop-like effect, congruent (i.e., same colors for square and frame) and incongruent (i.e., 
different colors for square and frame) responses were compared. To measure the Simon effect, corresponding 
(i.e., the position of the response corresponded to the position of the stimulus) and non-corresponding (i.e., the 
position of the response did not correspond to the position of the stimulus) responses were compared. The time 
course of both the RT Stroop-like effect and the RT Simon effect was investigated by applying the Vincentizing 
procedure75. The RT distribution for each participant and congruent/correspondence condition was divided into 
quartiles (bins), and the mean of RT for each quartile was calculated. We calculated as well the size of both the 
Stroop-like effect and the Simon effect for each bin, subtracting the mean RT for the congruent responses from 
the mean RT for the incongruent ones and the mean RT for the corresponding responses from the mean RT for 
the non-corresponding ones, for the Stroop-like and the Simon effect, respectively.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was run with Bin (1–4), Stroop-like task (congruent vs. incongruent trials) 
and Simon task (corresponding vs. non-corresponding trials) as within-subjects factors. Note that, considering 
the way the data were grouped, the Bin main effect was necessarily significant in all analyses. Therefore, it is not 
reported and discussed here or later on. Data are shown in Table 1.
The main effect of Stroop-like task was significant, F(1,13) = 88.73, MSe = 1363.603, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.872, that 
is, responses were faster when the square and the frame had a congruent rather than an incongruent color (439 
vs. 486 ms). The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of Simon task, F(1, 13) = 8.509, MSe = 4130.233, 
p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.396, that is, responses were faster when target and response positions were corresponding rather 
than non-corresponding (450 vs. 475 ms, respectively). The interaction was not significant, F(1, 13) = 0.838, p = 0. 
377, ηp2 = 0.061, indicating that the Stroop-like task and the Simon task did not interact and thus yielded additive 
effects.
The Bin × Stroop-like task interaction was significant, F(3, 39) = 17.58, MSe = 281.498, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.575. 
Paired sample t-tests showed that the Stroop-like effect was significant at all bins, ts(13) > 5.258, ps < 0.001. 
Helmert contrasts showed that its size increased significantly from bin 1 to bin 3 (29, 50, 63 ms, respectively), 
Fs(1,13) > 8.561, ps < 0.012, ηp2s > 0.397 and remained stable from bin 3 to bin 4 (56 ms), F(1,13) = 2.007, 
p = 0.180, ηp2 = 0.134 (see Fig. 2, top panel).
The Bin × Simon task interaction was significant too, F(3, 39) = 3.802, MSe = 420.877, p = 0.028, ηp2 = 0.226. 
Paired sample t-tests showed that the Simon effect was significant at bin 1, 2 and 3, ts(13) > 2.474, ps < 0.028, and 









SimonLower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Experiment1
RTs 439 417 461 486 458 515 47* 450 422 479 475 450 500 25*
Ers 6.8 4.5 9.1 9.6 6.8 12.3 2.8 8.4 6.0 10.0 8 5.4 10.5 −0.4
Experiment 2
RTs 451 416 485 498 464 533 47* 465 433 497 484 447 521 19*
ERs 2.9 1.7 4.0 5.5 3.6 7.2 2.6* 4.2 2.9 5.5 4.1 2.6 5.6 −0.1
Table 1. Mean Response Times (in Milliseconds) and Error Rates (in percentage) for Congruent (CO) and 
Incongruent (IN), Corresponding (C) and Non-Corresponding (NC) trials, with their 95% Confidence Interval 
(C.I.) and the resulting Stroop-like and Simon effects. The Stroop-like effect is computed by subtracting 
reactions times and error rates in congruent trials from the ones in incongruent trials, while the Simon effect 
is computed by subtracting reaction times and error rates in corresponding trials from the ones in non-
corresponding trials. Asterisks denote significant differences.
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1 to bin 2 (34 and 39 ms, respectively), F(1,13) = 1.523, p = 0.239, ηp2 = 0.105, decreased significantly from bin 
2 to bin 3 (30 ms), F(1,13) = 15.346, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.541, and remained stable from bin 3 to bin 4 (11 ms), F 
(1,13) = 4.227, p = 0.060, ηp2 = 0.245 (see Fig. 2, top panel).
ERs showed no significant main effects or interaction, Fs < 4.003, ps > 0.06.
Experiment 2. Three participants, who made 9% of errors or more (corresponding to the mean of the errors 
of all participants plus one standard deviation), were excluded, so that the final sample consisted of 16 partici-
pants. Omissions (3.46%) and RTs faster/slower than the overall participant mean minus/plus 2 standard devia-
tions (4.16%) were excluded from the analyses.
Mean RTs of correct responses and arcsin-transformed ERs (4.19% of total trials) were analyzed as in 
Experiment 1. When sphericity was violated, the Huynh-Feldt correction was applied, although the original 
degrees of freedom are reported.
The main effect of Stroop-like task was significant, F(1,15) = 86.743, MSe = 1630.411, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.853, 
that is, responses were faster when the square and the frame had a congruent color rather than an incongruent 
color (451 vs. 498 ms, respectively). The analysis also revealed a main effect of Simon task, F(1, 15) = 10.089, 
MSe = 2231.946, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.402, that is, responses were faster when target and response positions were 
corresponding rather than non-corresponding (465 vs. 484 ms, respectively). The interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 15) = 1.748, MSe = 1309.682, p = 0.206, ηp2 = 0.104, indicating that the Stroop-like effect and the Simon effect 
were additive.
The Bin × Stroop-like task interaction was significant, F(3, 45) = 4.017, MSe = 429.067, p = 0.043, ηp2 = 0.211. 
Paired sample t-tests showed that the Stroop-like effect was significant at all bins, ts(15) > 5.030, ps < 0.001. 
Helmert contrasts showed that its size increased significantly from bin 1 to bin 2 (41 and 52 ms), F (1,15) = 5.852, 
p = 0.029, ηp2 = 0.281 and remained stable from bin 2 to bin 4 (64 and 54 ms), Fs (1,15) < 1.823, ps > 0.197, 
ηp2s < 0.108 (see Fig. 2, bottom panel).
The Bin × Simon task interaction was not significant, F(3, 45) = 2.276, p = 0.135, ηp2 = 0.132, suggesting a sta-
ble Simon effect from bin 1 to bin 4 (31, 26, 24, and 17 ms, respectively), even though, at least numerically, the 
effect seemed to decline (see Fig. 2, bottom panel).
ERs showed a main effect of Stroop-like task, F(1, 15) = 4.438, MSe = 0.16, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.228, indicating that 
responses were more accurate in the congruent than in the incongruent conditions (2.9 vs. 5.5%). No other main 
effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 0.570, ps > 0.462, ηp2 s< 0.037.
Additional analyses. Neither Experiment revealed an interaction between Simon and Stroop-like conflicts, 
thus suggesting additivity between the two effects (see Table 2 for details). However, based on the procedure of 
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST76) the null hypothesis can never be accepted. One just fails to reject it. 
Therefore, our results are, in a certain sense, still inconclusive. We, therefore, collated the data from participants 
in both experiments and performed a Bayesian hypothesis testing using the BIC approximation76,77. This analysis 
was aimed at comparing the plausibility of the null and the alternative hypotheses concerning the interaction 
between Simon and Stroop-like conflicts. It was conducted with the R software program78 using the lme479 library. 
According to Wagenmakers76, “assuming the models under consideration are equally plausible a priori, a compar-
ison of their BIC values easily yields an approximation of their posterior probabilities” (p. 796). We found that the 
BIC approximation of the Bayes factor (BF01), expressing the probability of the data given H0 (i.e., no interaction) 
Figure 2. Size of the Stroop-like effect (grey line) and of the Simon effect (black line) as a function of Bins for 
Experiment 1 (top panel) and Experiment 2 (bottom panel). Bars are confidence intervals.
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relative to H1 (i.e., interaction), was BF01 = 5.2 (for a detailed description of how the BIC approximation of the 
Bayes factor can be derived see Appendix B in76; see also80,81). Hence, according to the BIC approximation of the 
Bayes factor (BF01), in our experiments H0 is between five and six times more likely than H1. That strengthens 
our conclusion in favor of additivity between Simon and Stroop-like conflicts, although additivity emerges from 
a non-significant interaction.
We also ran a between experiments analysis for both RTs and Ers, which was aimed at verifying our predic-
tions that faster and more accurate responses should be observed when people are required to discriminate the 
color of the frame. This is because, perceptual processes could be temporally organized such that they might 
proceed from processing the global structure to more fine-grained analysis72–74. The finding of faster RT and more 
accurate responses when the feature to be discriminated pertains to a more peripheral component of the stimulus 
(i.e. the frame) would suggest that the processing stage involved is perceptual rather than decisional in nature. 
Indeed, Navon’s hypothesis specifically concerns perceptual processes.
RTs. An ANOVA with Bin (1–4), Stroop-like task (congruent vs. incongruent trials) and Simon task (correspond-
ing vs. non-corresponding trials) as within-subject factors and Experiment (1 vs. 2) as between-subjects factor was 
run. Results showed a marginally significant three-way interaction between Bin, Stroop-like task and Experiment, 
F(3,84) = 2.712, MSe = 197.311, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.088. While in Experiment 1 Helmert contrasts showed that the 
size of the Stroop-like effect increased significantly from bin 1 to bin 3 and remained stable from bin 3 to bin 4, in 
Experiment 2, Helmert contrasts showed that the size of the Stroop-like effect increased significantly from bin 1 to 
bin 2 and remained stable from bin 2 to bin 4. No other interaction was significant, Fs < 0.785, ps > 0.506, ηp2 < 0.027.
ERs. An ANOVA with Stroop-like task (congruent vs. incongruent trials) and Simon task (corresponding vs. 
non-corresponding trials) as within-subject factors and Experiment (1 vs. 2) as between-subjects factor was run. 
Results showed a main effect of Experiment, F(1, 28) = 17.797, MSe = 0.015, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.389, that is, mean 
percentage of ERs in Experiment 1 was greater than mean percentage of ERs in Experiment 2 (7.7% vs. 4.2%, 
respectively). No other interaction was significant, Fs < 0.075, ps > 0.786, ηp2 s< 0.003.
General Discussion
The present study examined the Stroop-like conflict in order to shed light on two different views that attempt 
to explain it. The Perceptual Account1–5 claims that the Stroop-like effect is due to S-S congruence or lack of it. 
The Decisional Account49–53 argues that the Stroop-like effect results from the same mechanisms underlying the 
Simon effect.
Experiment 1 tested whether discriminating left or right-located colored squares surrounded by a frame of 
the same color as the square or of a different color (e.g., “red square - red frame” or “red square - blue frame”), 
yielded additive or interactive Stroop-like and Simon effects. Experiment 2 further investigated whether discrim-
inating the color of the frame rather than that of the square entailed the same or different results compared to 
Experiment 1. According to Navon’s72–74 hypothesis, perceptual processes proceed from the global structure to 
a more fine-grained analysis of the stimulus. We hypothesized that, if discriminating a characteristic of a more 
peripheral component of the stimulus facilitates performance, then the experimental manipulation from the task 
is likely to affect perceptual processing (i.e., stimulus identification stage) rather than decisional mechanisms (i.e., 
response selection stage).
Experiment Stroop Simon Mean
C.I
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Experiment 1
RTs
IN NC 497 469 526
CO NC 453 431 475
IN C 475 442 508
CO C 425 400 451
ERs
IN NC 9.2 5.7 12.7
CO NC 6.6 4.0 9.3
IN C 9.8 6.1 13.6
CO C 7.0 4.1 9.9
Experiment 2
RTs
IN NC 505 465 545
CO NC 463 428 499
IN C 492 462 522
CO C 438 403 473
ERs
IN NC 5.3 3.1 7.4
CO NC 3.0 1.2 4.8
IN C 5.6 3.3 7.9
CO C 2.8 1.8 3.7
Table 2. Means for each experimental condition: Incongruent (IN)-Non Corresponding (NC), Congruent (CO)-
Non Corresponding (NC), Incongruent (IN)-Corresponding (C), and Congruent (CO)-Corresponding (C) with 
their 95% Confidence Interval (C.I.) for both RTs (Milliseconds) and ERs (%) from both Experiment 1 and 2.
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We found that the Stroop-like and Simon effects were additive in both experiments, which, according to 
Sternberg’s24 AFM, indicates that the processing of the S-S conflict and the processing of the S-R conflict are 
independent. A Bayesian analysis further confirmed this conclusion by showing positive evidence in favor of the 
null hypothesis, which attested additivity. In addition, in line with previous studies comparing the distributional 
properties of Stroop and Simon effects20 (Experiment 1; see also82 for a discussion on delta plots), the analyses on 
RT distributions showed different patterns for Stroop-like and Simon effects. In either experiment, the Stroop-like 
effect was smallest for fast responses and increased as responses slowed down. By contrast, in Experiment 1, and 
only numerically in Experiment 2, the Simon effect was largest for fast responses and decreased as responses 
slowed down. Importantly, these results were obtained with perceptual rather than linguistic stimuli (or, at the 
very least, stimuli that were less prominently linguistic in nature). Indeed, our experiments eliminated, or much 
attenuated, the confound between stimulus attributes (e.g., semantic vs. non-semantic in nature), which ren-
dered interpretation of the results of previous studies uncertain. Stroop-like and Simon tasks in either experiment 
involved the conflict of perceptual information: square and frame colors (Experiment 1), and frame and square 
colors (Experiment 2) for the Stroop-like task and square and response positions (Experiment 1), and frame 
and response position (Experiment 2) for the Simon task. Therefore, both conflicts in either task concerned 
non-semantic perceptual information (i.e., color or position). The fact that our Stroop-like effect apparently 
was not reduced or absent further supports the notion that our stimuli were non-semantic (or less semantic) in 
nature. Indeed, the Stroop effect with colored words (i.e., the classical Stroop effect) is typically reduced62,83 or 
even absent65,84 with manual responses.
The additional analysis performed in order to compare Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that participants made 
fewer errors when they had to discriminate the color of the frame (Experiment 2) rather than that of the square 
(Experiment 1). Also, in Experiment 2, participants made fewer errors when they had to discriminate the color 
of the frame in the congruent condition. That is consistent with the notion that, if a task requires discriminating a 
characteristic pertaining to a more peripheral component of the stimulus, performance is facilitated.
It is important to note that, rather than adopting a flanker paradigm, as some of the previous studies combin-
ing the Stroop and Simon tasks had done19,40 we chose a Stroop-like paradigm, in which the target conveys both 
the relevant (the square color in Experiment 1 and the frame color in Experiment 2) and irrelevant (the frame 
color in Experiment 1 and the square color in Experiment 2) information. Therefore, we can rule out an expla-
nation based on perceptual grouping (when target and flanker are of the same color) or referential coding (when 
target and flanker are of different colors)57–60.
Our results, besides being generally in favor of the Perceptual Account, support the Dimensional Overlap 
model2–4 and the resulting taxonomy that differentiates Stroop-like from Simon effects. This model assumes that, 
since the stimuli are unrelated to the responses, no response activation and response competition processes, able 
to produce compatibility effects, can occur in Stroop-like tasks.
It is worth emphasizing that although De Houwer49 showed that the Stroop-like effect is partly due to S-R 
compatibility based on short-term associations created on the basis of task instructions, he concurrently found 
an important role of S-S congruence in the occurrence of the Stroop-like effect. He compared word triads in three 
conditions: identical trials (i.e., trials in which all three words were the same, e.g., blue-blue-blue); same-response 
trials (i.e., trials in which the irrelevant flanker words differed from the middle target word but all three words 
were assigned to the same response, e.g., purple-blue-purple); and different-response trials (i.e., trials in which 
the irrelevant flanker words differed from the middle target word and were assigned to different responses, e.g., 
green-blue-green). The target word was always the middle word, which in here is reported in italics. Importantly, 
he mapped two words (e.g., blue and purple) to each response (e.g., left). Participants were asked to respond 
on the basis of the meaning (Experiment 1) or of the ink color (Experiment 2) of the middle target word. It 
was shown that same response trials were significantly faster than different-response trials, thus indicating S-R 
compatibility underlying the Stroop-like effect given that same- and -different-response trials only differed 
as to whether the flanker and target words were assigned to the same or to different responses through task 
instructions. However, same-response trials were significantly slower than identical trials, hence suggesting a 
concurrent impact of S-S congruence on the Stroop-like effect. That is because in both conditions (identical and 
same-response trials) flanker words were assigned to the same-response as target words, yet target and flanker 
words only matched on identical trials (e.g., blue-blue-blue).
In conclusion, our findings support the Perceptual Account of the Stroop-like effect demonstrating that it is 
largely due to perceptual processing as shown by additivity, different time courses of the two effects (Stroop-like 
and Simon effects) and a somewhat facilitated performance in discriminating a characteristic pertaining to a 
more peripheral component of the stimulus.
Methods
Data Availability. The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are available in the Open 
Science Framework repository, https://osf.io/8nwdz/?view_only = 2527d67247dc4cbeb9ac7ecc8110eed0.
Participants. Sixteen students (11 females; 2 left-handed; mean age: 20.53, SD: 1.58) and nineteen different 
students (11 females; 3 left handed; mean age: 21.26, SD: 3.38) from the University of Bologna participated in 
Experiment 1 and 2, respectively in exchange for course credits. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. The experiment was performed with approval of the 
ethical committee of the University of Bologna and in accordance with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later 
amendments or comparable ethical standards. Written informed consent was obtained from all individual par-
ticipants included in the study.
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Apparatus, stimuli and procedure. The experiments were conducted in a quiet room, where the light was 
dimmed. Stimuli were presented on a 17 inches video monitor (1.6 Ghz refresh rate) on a white background. The 
viewing distance was 60 cm. Stimuli presentation and response collection were controlled by E-Prime Professional 
v2.0 software (http://www.pstnet.com). Stimuli were blue/red squares (visual angle: 1.9° × 1.9°) presented at the 
left/right of the central fixation cross (0.8° × 0.8°). The squares were always surrounded by a frame that could be 
either of the same color as the square or of a different color. The colored surface areas covered by the square and 
by the frame measured approximately the same area (4 cm²; 3.85 cm², respectively). Square and frame of the same 
color produced the Stroop-like congruent condition, whereas when they were of different colors they produced 
the Stroop-like incongruent condition.
Trials began with presentation of the fixation cross. After 1000 ms the target stimulus appeared and remained 
on the screen for 300 ms. Target offset was followed by a blank interval of 2000 ms.
Half of the participants were instructed to press the right key (i.e., “-”) in response to the blue square and the 
left key (i.e., “z”) in response to the red square. The other participants were assigned to the reverse mapping. They 
were required to ignore the location of the stimulus and respond only to the color of the square as quickly and as 
accurately as possible.
The experiments consisted of two blocks of 120 randomly mixed trials, equally distributed across the 8 types 
of trials (2 Square Colors × 2 Frame Colors × 2 Target Positions) and lasted approximately 10 minutes each. The 
experimental sessions were preceded by a practice session composed of 24 trials.
Trials were classified into 4 different conditions (Stroop-like congruent and Simon corresponding; Stroop-like 
congruent and Simon non-corresponding; Stroop-like incongruent and Simon corresponding; Stroop-like incon-
gruent and Simon non-corresponding) based on the presence and nature of the conflict (See Fig. 1 for a schematic 
representation of the stimuli).
In Experiment 2, the apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same as those in Experiment 1. The only 
difference was that participants were required to respond to the color of the frame (rather than that of the square).
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